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CANADA’S EQUALIZATION
FORMULA: PEERING INSIDE THE
BLACK BOX … AND BEYOND†
Jim Feehan 
SUMMARY
Ontario only started receiving equalization payments, for the first time in its history, in 2009. As soon as Ontario
slipped into that “have-not” status, the federal government imposed a cap on the growth of equalization payouts.
That led to substantial federal savings, but has cost Ontario and other recipients what would have been much larger
payments since then. The federal government’s move to rein in the potential ballooning cost of equalization may have
been understandable, from a cost-control perspective, but it ultimately defied the very purpose of equalization.
The fixed-growth rule imposed by the federal government is just one of several elements within the current
equalization arrangement that should be corrected. The federal government should end that practice and absorb
any resulting increase in cost. However, if that cost is onerous, then it could consider adjustments of its other major
transfers to the provinces – Canada Health Transfer and the Canada Social Transfer – and reduce those per-capita
transfers to provinces that are well ahead of the equalization norm. That would be better than shifting the entire
burden to the those below the norm.
Another flaw in the current equalization arrangement is the inclusion of Crown-owned hydro corporations’
remittances of earnings to their provincial owners in the natural resources category of equalization calculations.
Many of these corporations are not simply energy producers, but are also vertically integrated, with transmission
and retail sales operations, and some have no resources at all, but rely instead on fuel purchased in the marketplace.
Moreover, taxes paid by private energy corporations are not considered part of the natural resource category but
are included in the business income tax category. This means the formula is essentially inconsistent, discriminating
based on the ownership profile. Hydro remittances should be removed from the natural resource revenue category
in the formula that calculates equalization. They should go in the business income tax category, just as do the
earnings of other commercial Crown corporations and taxes paid by private businesses. Going beyond the formula,
it is time to re-consider the practice of exempting commercial Crown corporations from corporate income taxation. 
A more fundamental and long-recognized problem is the incentive for provinces receiving equalization payments
to underprice the water-rental rates they charge for hydro production. Lowering water-rental rates has the effect
of reducing provincial hydro revenues, which can entitle those provinces to larger equalization payments, while
benefitting residents with cheaper hydro rates. Looked at empirically, “have-not” provinces do charge lower
average rates for hydro than do “have” provinces, lending credence to the criticism that non-recipient provinces
subsidize cheaper energy for residents of recipient provinces. The increased development of competitive North
American wholesale electricity markets in recent decades has made it more feasible to assess what a fair market
price for water-rental rates could be. Updating the equalization formula to consider not water-rental revenue, but
water-rental fiscal capacity, should be the highest priority of all in reforming Canada’s equalization formula to align
it more closely to the principles behind its creation.
It is also time to include municipal government revenues from user fees in the formula. Those revenues are
significant and it makes little sense to exclude them when municipal property tax revenues are included.  
Equalization is not out of control but reform is needed. Action on these fronts should be the priorities. These inside-
the-box issues should be resolved before going beyond and considering the more complex task of extending the
formula to account for provincial governments’ different expenditure needs and costs.
† This paper is based on a presentation given at the Equalization Grants conference, hosted by The School of
Public Policy, University of Calgary, January 28-29, 2014. I am grateful to Mel McMillan and David Péloquin, as
well as two anonymous referees, for valuable comments. I am solely responsible for any errors. 
INTRODUCTION
Canada’s system of federal-provincial relationships is complex. There are areas of joint or
overlapping federal and provincial jurisdictions, grey areas of jurisdiction, complex tax-
harmonization and co-ordination arrangements, shared-cost and joint programs, and substantial
transfers from the federal to provincial governments and territories. The pillars of those federal
transfers are the Canada Health Transfer (CHT), the Canada Social Transfer (CST) and
equalization payments. The CST and CHT serve, at least primarily, to address the vertical fiscal
imbalance in the federation. This imbalance reflects the fact that, compared to any one province,
the federal government has superior revenue-raising capacity on the one hand, and the provinces
have, on the other hand, greater spending responsibilities. The CST and CHT have evolved from
earlier forms of federal transfers, such as 50-50 cost sharing, and are now equal per capita grants
with relatively few strings attached. Provincial governments can use these funds in any way they
want, subject to adherence to certain principles regarding their health- and hospital-insurance
regimes, social-welfare policies and post-secondary education policies. 
Equalization is different. It is a system of variable transfers to those provincial governments
that, according to some measure, are not able to raise revenues to the same extent as others. In
the language of the program, equalization payments are made to provincial governments that
have weak fiscal capacities. That is to say, if these provinces were to tax at “average” rates, their
economies are such that the resulting revenue per capita would be less than average. In this
sense, equalization serves to address the horizontal fiscal imbalance — that is, differences in
provincial governments’ fiscal capacities.1 Without equalization payments, those with weaker
fiscal capacities would not be able to give their residents a mix of tax burdens and public
services as attractive as those in other provinces with much higher fiscal capacities. Implicit in
this reasoning is an assumption that differences in fiscal capacities across provinces are long
lasting. Otherwise, a provincial government could borrow in years when it goes below the norm,
and run budget surpluses to pay down debts in years when its fiscal capacity is above average.
That would not work for a province with a persistently weak fiscal capacity. As it turns out,
history confirms that a provincial government’s position, either below or above some fiscal
capacity norm or standard, is very long lasting. However, recent events demonstrate that
positions need not be permanent. There have been dramatic shifts for some provinces in the past
decade. These shifts have ignited concerns about the design of the equalization program and its
effectiveness.
Since its inception, the equalization program has been subject to formal renewal processes.
Normally, these renewals take place every five years and — despite the fact that equalization is
a federal government program, and there are no provincial government contributions to it —
involve consultations with the provinces. While the federal government can, and has at times,
changed aspects of the program in the years between renewals, the renewal process is intended
to set the course until the next five-year period. Much has happened since the current formula
was put in place in fiscal year 2007-08. This essay reflects on those developments and discusses
some of the challenges to the program and how they might be addressed in the 2014 renewal or
thereafter. The focus will be on the inner workings of the formula but, before the conclusion,
some observations on the broader context will be made.
1 In the form of equal per capita grants, the CST and CHT also narrow the vertical imbalance to some extent.
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BACKGROUND
There is extensive literature on Canada’s equalization program. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile
to provide a brief overview for completeness and to help set the stage for the remainder of this
essay. There are a number of excellent histories of Canada’s equalization program, notably
Courchene, for the earlier years, and Perry.2 While suggestions for an equalization-type
program can be found earlier, it was in 1957 that the equalization program was first instituted
by the federal government. In essence, the program was the product of tax decentralization
following the Second World War. To finance the war effort, taxation had been highly
concentrated with the federal government and, under tax-rental agreements, provincial
governments received compensation for agreeing to discontinue levying some major taxes such
as income taxes. These arrangements provided the federal government with the scope to raise
the enormous sums needed for the military. After the war, however, the federal government no
longer needed such concentrated taxation power and, with the great expansion of the welfare
state, provincial governments faced greater expenditure pressure. Short of a constitutional shift
of provincial responsibilities to the federal government, which was not a serious option and
which some provinces, particularly Quebec, would have strongly opposed, the provinces
needed more money. As the federal government opened up “tax room,” by lowering its rates
and facilitating co-ordinated and orderly provincial re-entry into certain tax areas, notably
personal and corporate income taxation, the need for some form of equalization became more
apparent. Quite simply, some provincial governments had weaker economies so, at any tax
rate, less revenue would be raised per capita than in the more prosperous provinces. Those
provincial governments would be less able to meet the growing demands for the public
services in areas under their jurisdiction, such as health services, social welfare and education.3
At the beginning, only three revenue sources were subject to equalization, namely personal
income tax, corporate income tax and succession duties. In 1962, with the first five-year
renewal, a fourth source came into play with the inclusion of half of provincial natural resource
revenues. By 1967, there were 16 sources, and by 1987, through the addition of more revenue
sources such as local property tax revenue in 1977, and the disaggregation of others, a total of 
2 Thomas J. Courchene, Equalization Payments: Past, Present and Future (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1984);
David B. Perry, Financing the Canadian Federation, 1867 to 1995: Setting the Stage for Change (Toronto: Canadian
Tax Foundation, 1997). Also, for a more up-to-date and an excellent compact history, see: Thomas Courchene, “A
Short History of Equalization,” Policy Options (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, March 2007).
3 After the beginning of the program, scholars developed more formal rationales for equalization. One rationale was
based on the notion of fiscal equity, a normative concept that argues that similar people should be similarly treated
by their federal and provincial governments regardless of their province of residence. This rationale is closely related
to the constitutional one mentioned in the text. Some economists took a different line and argued that different mixes
of provincial taxes and public services could induce migration, solely for reasons of obtaining a better mix. Such
migration can be inconsistent with the migration needed to achieve economic efficiency. Equalization payments
could serve to counteract that phenomenon. This is the efficiency argument for equalization. For seminal work in this
area, see: Frank Flatters, Vernon Henderson and Peter Mieszkowski, “Public Goods, Efficiency and Regional
Equalization,” Journal of Public Economics 3 (1974): 99-112; and Robin W. Boadway and Frank Flatters,
“Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent
Results,” Canadian Journal of Economics 14 (1982): 613-633. For an overview, see: Robin W. Boadway, “The
Theory and Practice of Equalization,” CESifo Economic Studies 50, 1 (2004): 211-254; and for a pioneering work,
see: James Buchanan, “Federal Grants and Resource Allocation,” Journal of Political Economy 60 (1952): 208-217.
2
337 sources were subject to equalization.4 Whatever the number of sources, the essential
calculation of a provincial government’s equalization entitlement is conceptually
straightforward. At the core of the calculation is the difference between two numbers. Letting E
denote a provincial government’s equalization entitlement per capita, it is calculated as:
(1) E  =  S - F
where 
S (the standard) is the estimated potential revenue a group of reference provinces could
raise if they applied a set of given (or “standard”) tax rates to specified revenue sources
within provincial jurisdiction; and
F (the province’s fiscal capacity) is the estimated potential revenue the provincial
government could raise if it imposed the same set of standard tax rates to the same
specified revenue sources within its jurisdiction;
and both are expressed on a per capita basis. The “standard tax rates” have varied over time
according to federal government changes in the program, but for the most part, these have been
the average rate across all 10 provinces for each tax source. The reference group of provinces
has also varied, from being comprised of the top two provinces, all 10, and five (British
Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec). Once those choices are made, the
calculation is straightforward in principle. If the province in question lags the reference-group
standard (i.e., F < S), then it is said to have a weak fiscal capacity and is entitled to an
equalization grant from the federal government equal to E, the gap between S and F, for each
person residing there. Conversely, if a provincial government’s revenue-raising capacity
exceeds the standard (F > S), then it receives no equalization entitlement. With revenue sources
so comprehensively included, this method of equalization grant calculation is known as the
representative tax system (RTS).
Despite the preceding simple illustration of a province’s equalization entitlement, there are
many complexities within the black box of equalization arithmetic. There are many revenue
sources and the tax bases of some of these are difficult to measure or are defined differently
across the provinces, making their comparability a challenge. There are time lags in data
availability, which can require re-calculations and adjustments in payments. Also, various
limits, adjustments, exclusions and special exemptions can be placed within the formula to
enrich or reduce a provincial government’s entitlements, or may be imposed to reduce the
aggregate cost of the program to the federal government. These considerations not only create
complexity, but changes in them or in the methodology for measuring underlying data can have
substantial budgetary implications for provincial and federal governments. Here, the federal
government is in the driver’s seat. Despite institutionalized consultations with the provinces
prior to renewals, equalization is a federal government program and the federal government
alone determines the formula and can change the formula as it sees fit, whether at renewal time
or not. Whenever the federal government proposes or makes changes, the provinces react. 
4 For a list of those 37 sources, see Perry, Financing the Canadian, 163-164.
Recipient provinces may see their entitlements rise or fall, and react accordingly. Even non-
recipient provincial governments are affected because a change in federal funding support for
equalization payments can have implications for other federal-provincial transfer programs and
expenditures that these “have” provinces do receive. Also, their residents, like those of other
provinces still contribute to the program via their payment of federal taxes.
Yet, the RTS-type equalization program is well embedded in the fabric of Canada’s federal-
provincial arrangements. Indeed, some 25 years after the program’s beginning, a commitment
to equalization payments was included in the Constitution Act of 1982. Section 36(2) commits
Parliament and the federal government to the principle of making equalization payments to the
provinces. That constitutional commitment does not directly refer to the program that has
existed since 1957; even equal per capita federal grants to all provincial governments have an
equalizing effect since disproportionately larger revenues would naturally come from provinces
with relatively stronger economies. However, this commitment can be readily interpreted as
support for the type of equalization program as has existed. After all, the framers of Section
36(2) were quite familiar with that program and it would have been the obvious point of
reference when using the term “equalization payments.” As of 2013, more than 30 years after
the Constitution Act of 1982, there has been no constitutional court challenge claiming that the
commitment means something different.
The most significant deviation from the RTS equalization formula occurred over fiscal years
2004-05 to 2006-07. In October 2004, then prime minister Paul Martin announced an
interruption in the equalization program, the five-year renewal of which had only started six
months earlier. A “new funding formula framework” would entail an immediate increase in
funding for equalization above the amount determined from the formula.5 In addition, and
again regardless of the formula, total payments were set to increase at a fixed rate of 3.5 per
cent annually thereafter. The total payout was allocated partly according to recent past shares
among recipients and partly on a per capita basis. If left in place, these arrangements would
have made equalization payments ever more unrelated to provinces’ fiscal capacities.
Reinforcing this movement of equalization away from the objective of mitigating differences in
fiscal capacities across provinces, Martin, during the federal election of June 2004, had
promised Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador an arrangement whereby they would
be compensated fully for any loss in equalization caused by improvements to those provincial
governments’ fiscal capacities due to offshore oil and gas production.6
5 For an excellent summary, see: Michael Holden, “Equalization: Implications of Recent Changes,” Library of
Parliament PRB 05-91E (Ottawa: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, January 4, 2006).
6 These agreements for offsetting payments were finalized in early 2005 and separate for each province. They were for
specified periods and subject to renewal if certain fiscal and debt measures of each provincial government did not
improve by agreed targets; for more details see: James P. Feehan, “Equalization 2007: Natural Resources, the Cap,
and the Offset Payment Agreements,” in Canada: The State of the Federation, ed. John R. Allan, Thomas J.
Courchene and Christian Leuprecht (Montreal- Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 175-200.
Previous agreements in the 1980s (the Atlantic Accord with Newfoundland and Labrador, and the Offshore Accord
with Nova Scotia) had already been in place and, as well as establishing respective joint management of offshore oil
and gas development, provided for partial compensation to those provinces during the early years of oil and gas
production for declines in equalization payments that were expected to arise from offshore royalties and related
revenues. However, by 2004, these provinces argued that those compensating payments had been very modest and
would end before offshore revenues would peak.
4
Fortunately, the new framework also included the formation of the Expert Panel on
Equalization and Territorial Formula Financing. That panel was tasked with advising the
federal government on those two important programs. Chaired by Al O’Brien, the panel
reported in May of 2006.7 The crux of the report’s advice was that equalization should be
returned to an RTS-type formula, one that determined equalization payments across provinces
according to the extent to which their respective fiscal capacities falls below a standard. Thus,
the total amount of equalization payments would be formula-driven, not determined in advance
by a fixed allotment as under the new framework. In addition, the panel considered many other
aspects of equalization and made several recommendations, some of the key ones are as follows.
• The standard should be a 10-province one. Since 1982, a five-province standard had been in
place.8 The apparent motive for the latter was to exclude Alberta’s huge oil and gas
revenues, thereby lowering the standard and making the program more affordable.
• Half of provincial natural resource revenues should be equalized. In particular, the
equalization of this revenue source should be based on actual revenues, not fiscal capacity,
which is a measure of the ability to raise revenue, whether it is raised or not.
• All the 33 revenue sources that were in the previous formula should be aggregated into five
categories; namely,
– personal income tax,
– business income tax,
– sales tax,
– natural resource revenues, and
– property tax.
• There should be a fiscal-capacity cap on equalization payments to recipient provincial
governments. The cap would be determined by examining the set of non-recipient provinces
and finding the one with the lowest sum of fiscal capacity and its remaining 50 per cent of
natural resources. That lowest sum would be the cap. For any recipient province, its
equalization entitlement would be reduced to the extent that its fiscal capacity plus its
remaining 50 per cent of natural resource revenues plus its equalization entitlement (and for
Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia, their offshore-related offset payments)
exceeds the cap.9
• Equalization entitlements should be based on a weighted average of a province’s annual
fiscal capacities, lagged two years. This technical change was to avoid the numerous
adjustments and corrections to estimated entitlements prior to 2004. This would make
payments more stable and predictable, desirable features for both the federal government
and recipient provincial governments.
7 The panel issued two comprehensive reports, one for equalization and one for territorial financing. For the former,
see: Expert Panel on Equalization and Territorial Formula Financing, Achieving a National Purpose: Putting
Equalization Back on Track (Ottawa: Department of Finance, Government of Canada, 2006).
8 The five-province standard was somewhat of a hybrid. It was calculated by applying the average tax rates across all
10 (not the five) provinces to five select provinces’ corresponding tax bases, and dividing the result by those
provinces’ total population to arrive at the per capita standard.
9 This was very controversial for those two provinces. Their equalization-loss offset payments under their respective
offshore agreements with the federal government were to compensate for reductions in equalization.  Feehan
(“Equalization 2007,” 88) observes that an inconsistency arises when a payment intended to offset a reduction in
equalization is used as a basis for reducing an equalization payment.
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CURRENT SITUATION
Despite a change in the ruling party, from Liberal to Conservative, the federal government
accepted practically all the expert panel’s advice and re-instituted an RTS system beginning
with fiscal year 2007-08. There were some add-ons as well, two of which are of note. First, if a
provincial government’s equalization entitlement were larger with all natural resource revenue
excluded from the formula, then it would receive that larger amount. The second add-on is
related to special treatment of Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia. To avoid the
fiscal-capacity cap, these provinces were given the option to continue to have their equalization
payments determined as if the previous new framework were still in operation.10
In short, the core of the formula introduced in 2007 defined the standard (S) and a province’s
fiscal capacity (F) in the following ways:
(3) S = t1B1 + t2B2+ t3B3 + t4B4 + 0.5N
and
(4) F = t1b1 + t2b2+ t3b3 + t4b4 + 0.5n
where the t1, t2 t3, and t4 represent the national average of provincial tax rates applicable to
personal income, business income, consumption expenditure, and property, respectively. Each
B denotes the corresponding amount of the relevant tax base summed across all provinces and
expressed on a per capita basis, while N is the sum of all natural resource revenues collected by
provincial governments expressed on a per capita basis. The lower case b’s and n are the
corresponding amounts for a particular province; thus, for each province, there is a different
value of F while S is invariant.11
Under the 2007 formula, a provincial government becomes eligible for an equalization
payment when its fiscal capacity (F) is less than the standard (S). However, whether it receives
a payment then depends on the workings of the fiscal-capacity cap, as defined earlier. The
actual per capita payment (P) to an eligible provincial government would correspond to
(5) P = (S – F) – A
where A represents the adjustment arising from the application of the fiscal-capacity cap; it
would be zero if the cap did not apply, or a positive number up to the value of (S-F) if the cap
was triggered.
10 For more details, see: Finance Canada, “Restoring Fiscal Balance for a Stronger Federation,” Budget 2007, Annex 4,
2007.
11 Following the recommendation of the expert panel report, the three-year weighted average of the annual values of the
standard and province’s fiscal capacity — lagged two years, with a 50 per cent weight on the most recent year and 25
per cent weights on the other years’ values — are used. 
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While equations (3), (4) and (5) capture the essence of the formula introduced in 2007, there
have been some changes since then. Before turning to those changes, it is worthwhile to look at
how provinces’ fiscal capacities have fared since 2007. Chart 1 shows each provincial
government’s fiscal capacity (F) relative to the standard, which is normalized to 100 for the
purpose of comparison, for 2007-08 and for 2013-14, the last year before program renewal.12
CHART 1 FISCAL CAPACITIES OF PROVINCES: 2007-08 VERSUS 2013-14
Based on data provided by Finance Canada
Three outstanding developments can be gleaned from the chart:
• Saskatchewan’s fiscal capacity increased to the point where it is no longer eligible to
receive equalization.13 This is a significant development because, except for 1975-76 and
1981-82 to 1985-86, that province had been in receipt of equalization. Its transition to
“have” status occurred in 2008-09 and was primarily due to increasing oil-and-gas tax and
royalty revenues.
• Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) also ceased to qualify for equalization. This change was
even more significant insofar as that province had been a recipient of equalization since
1957 and was very heavily dependent on equalization payments for most of those years.
Like Saskatchewan, it ceased qualifying for equalization in 2008-09. Surging provincial
revenues from offshore oil was the cause of this change in status. Also, under the Atlantic
Accord of 1985 and the more recent 2005 agreement with the federal government, that
province continued to receive offsetting payments to compensate for reductions in
equalization until 2011-12. Its revenue circumstances improved to the point that, in 2012-
13, it no longer qualified for such payments either and all special arrangements in that
regard have now lapsed.14
12 I am grateful to the officials in the federal-provincial relations division of Finance Canada for their assistance in
providing data.
13 See: Alex S. MacNevin, The Canadian Federal-Provincial Equalization Regime: An Assessment, Canadian Tax Paper
109 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2004), 293-294.
14 The government of Nova Scotia still has such arrangements in place. Its offshore revenues are relatively modest and
not enough to trigger an end to the compensating payments in 2012. However, under the agreements, those payments
will end by 2020. In the meantime, its equalization payments are governed by the existing formula but with a
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• Ontario’s fiscal capacity exceeded the standard in 2007-08 but by 2013-14 it had fallen
below. The actual change occurred in 2009-10, the first time in the history of Canada’s
equalization program that Ontario became a recipient.15
While the change in status for Saskatchewan and, especially, Newfoundland and Labrador was
a major development for those provinces, it was Ontario’s change in status that had far-
reaching implications for the equalization program. Looking at Chart 1, Ontario’s 2013-14
shortfall from the standard appears quite modest, but the implications are not. Ontario has a
huge population, so even if its fiscal capacity is modestly below S, which is a per capita
measure, its total entitlement becomes a large portion of the total equalization payout. Table 1
illustrates this phenomenon. That table shows the evolution of equalization payments during
the new-framework regime and the current formula. The year 2008-09 was pivotal. It was the
first year in which Newfoundland and Labrador and Saskatchewan were no longer recipients
and the last year that Ontario enjoyed “have” status. More significantly, however, is what
happened thereafter. In 2009-10, Ontario received its first ever equalization payment: only $0.3
billion out of total payments of approximately $14.2 billion. However, by 2013-14 the payment
to Ontario was almost $3.2 billion, while the sum of payments across all recipient provinces
was $16.1 billion. Thus, the increase in payments to Ontario exceeded the increase in total
payments. 
Indeed, it was Ontario’s entry into equalization eligibility status that led to the two most
significant changes in the equalization formula over the 2007-08 to 2013-14 interval. Both
were introduced in the 2009-10 federal budget.16 They were: (i) the redefinition of the fiscal-
capacity cap and, far more significantly, (ii) the introduction of a fixed growth rate in total
payments.
TABLE 1 EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS BY PROVINCE ($ MILLIONS)
Source: Finance Canada
15 Ontario did qualify for equalization from 1977-78 to 1982, but a personal-income override was added to the formula,
which made that province ineligible; see: Perry, Financing the Canadian, 139-140. The override denied equalization
to any equalization-eligible provincial government where per capita personal income exceeded the national figure.
Only Ontario was affected by that provision.
16 For further elaboration and assessment of these changes, as well as changes to the other major federal transfers to the
provinces, see: Michael Smart, “The Evolution of Federal Transfers since the O’Brien Report,” paper prepared for
“The Federal Budget: Challenge, response and Retrospect,” John Deutsch Institute conference, 2009.
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2004-05 $761.8 $277.4 $1,313.1 $1,326.4 $4,154.7 $0 $1,606.9 $652.2 $0 $682.0 $10,774.5
2005-06 $861.0 $276.6 $1,343.5 $1,348.0 $4,798.1 $0 $1,601.0 $82.2 $0 $589.7 $10,900.0
2006-07 $686.6 $291.3 $1,385.5 $1,450.8 $5,539.3 $0 $1,709.4 $12.7 $0 $459.4 $11,535.1
2007-08 $477.4 $294.0 $1,464.5 $1,476.5 $7,160.4 $0 $1,825.8 $226.1 $0 $0 $12,924.7
2008-09 $0 $321.7 $1,464.9 $1,583.8 $8,028.4 $0 $2,063.4 $0 $0 $0 $13,462.2
2009-10 $0 $339.9 $1,390.7 $1,689.4 $8,354.5 $347.0 $2,063.4 $0 $0 $0 $14,185.0
2010-11 $0 $329.8 $1,110.3 $1,581.5 $8,552.2 $972.1 $1,826.0 $0 $0 $0 $14,372.0
2011-12 $0 $328.8 $1,167.0 $1,482.8 $7,814.5 $2,199.5 $1,665.9 $0 $0 $0 $14,658.6
2012-13 $0 $337.1 $1,268.0 $1,494.9 $7,391.1 $3,260.7 $1,670.7 $0 $0 $0 $15,422.5
2013-14 $0 $339.5 $1,457.9 $1,513.1 $7,833.0 $3,169.4 $1,792.3 $0 $0 $0 $16,105.2
NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC Total
Originally, and consistent with the expert-panel report, the fiscal-capacity cap was defined as the
lowest value from the set of fiscal capacities plus the remaining 50 per cent of natural resource
revenues of the non-eligible provinces. Up to that time, Ontario’s fiscal capacity was the fiscal-
capacity cap. As Smart points out,17 with no change in definition, once Ontario was no longer a
non-recipient, the fiscal-capacity cap would be set by British Columbia and be much higher. In
other words, it would be less binding on recipients and therefore increase equalization costs.
However, the federal government redefined the fiscal-capacity cap as the average of the sum of
equalization recipients’ (a) fiscal capacity (as given by equation 4), (b) their remaining 50 per
cent of natural resource revenues per capita, and (c) their equalization payments per capita. The
effect of this redefinition was to avoid a large increase in total payments.18
The second change was also motivated by a desire to limit growth in program costs. The
federal government imposed a fixed rate of growth in total payments: the growth rate of
nominal gross domestic product (GDP). As a result, the core calculation of a province’s per
capita equalization payment is no longer given by (5). It became:
(6) P = (S - F) - A* - R,
where A* is the value of any reduction due to the redefined fiscal-capacity cap, and R denotes
the reduction in the payment necessary to keep aggregate payments at the level dictated by the
set growth rate. In essence, the application of (6) follows a sequential process. First, the
difference S-F is determined for all provinces and only those for which the difference is
positive are eligible for an equalization payment. Next, for each of those provinces, the value
of (S-F) - A* is calculated. Finally, if the sum of the amounts so calculated exceed the total
budget limit, then an equal per capita amount, R, is subtracted from each province’s (S-F) - A*,
sufficient to achieve the budget limit.
Since 2009-10, equalization payments have been determined according to (6) in conjunction
with (3) and (4). The program is scheduled to be renewed for 2014-15 to 2018-19. The change
in Ontario’s status and the associated 2009 changes to the formula raise significant issues that
need to be addressed in a revised formula. Also, those developments are intertwined with other
debates about equalization that have been in play for a long time.
ISSUE: THE FIXED GROWTH RATE
The most troublesome change to the equalization formula since 2007 has been the re-
introduction of a fixed aggregate for total equalization payments.19 It marks a dramatic turn
away from the expert-panel-based formula and a return to the flawed 2004 new framework.20
17 Smart, “The Evolution of.”
18 Smart (ibid.) observes that this redefinition also has some justification based on fairness and has the beneficial effect
of reliance on a less volatile metric.
19 A ceiling was also placed on aggregate equalization payments as part of the 1982-83 renewal but apparently did not
become binding until 1988-89; see: Perry, Financing the Canadian, 162. It was set at the growth rate of the economy. 
20 The new framework was more severe insofar as funding increases were allocated by reference to historical payments
rather than changes in relative fiscal capacities. 
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This measure reduces the formula to an allocator of a pre-determined annual amount, not a
determinant of that amount. It is particularly problematic because, under such an arrangement,
the aggregate of equalization payments becomes less and less reflective of the fiscal gaps
across provinces. The fundamental principle that payments should rise when fiscal gaps
become relatively more severe, and should fall when those gaps diminish, is violated by this
allocation rule.
The underlying motives for having an annual fixed envelope are predictability and
affordability. In this case, the latter seems to be the primary concern. After all, the adoption of
the expert-panel report’s recommendation to the use of weighted averages of three years of
fiscal capacity, lagged two years, to determine a province’s equalization entitlement, makes it
quite straightforward to forecast provincial entitlements and federal costs. The equalization
program is a federal one and only the federal government pays for it. Since 2008-09, the non-
recipient provinces have also been those that are particularly rich in oil and gas. Any surge in
prices for those commodities impact the formula and eventually raises the standard. The federal
government would then be obligated to make larger payments to those provinces below the
then-higher standard. Another affordability problem can arise if Ontario, which has been a
recipient of equalization since 2009-10, sees its fiscal capacity fall further relative to the
standard. Being the most populous province, even a modest increase in its per capita
entitlement could translate into a huge increase in its total entitlement. 
The fixed envelope was imposed in 2009-10, the same year that Ontario became eligible for
equalization. Since then, it has resulted in substantial savings for the federal government. Table
2 shows those savings.21 Interestingly, and taking into account the weighted averaging and two-
year lap in the formula, the biggest saving, more than $4.5 billion in 2010-11, appears to reflect
two events. The first was the huge spike in petroleum prices in 2008, which benefitted the four
current “have” provinces especially, and the second was the recession, which hit Ontario, a
province with practically no oil and gas, particularly hard. 
Also, Table 2 shows that there would have been a bulge in equalization payments if the fixed
growth rate were not in play. However, the circumstances that pushed the standard up while
pushing Ontario down may well have been transitory. Oil prices have moderated since the
peaks of 2008, natural gas prices have fallen dramatically, and Ontario is out of recession.22
The key question here is whether the equalization formula should have been allowed to work
to alleviate the temporary but sharp shift in fiscal capacities of Ontario and the oil and gas
provinces. The answer is: yes, it should have been allowed to work. That is its purpose.23
21 Table 2 shows the reduction based on the 2009-10 formula. Smart (“The Evolution of”) points out that for 2009-10,
the difference between the entitlement under the 2008-09 formula and the 2009-10 formula is larger; approximately
$1.9 billion rather than the $981 million shown in Table 2.
22 Latest figures from Finance Canada indicate that Ontario’s equalization payment for 2014-15 will fall from $3.17
billion to just under $2 billion out of a total payout of $16.7 billion, which reinforces this proposition that the surge
in total payments that would have occurred in 2009 to 2012 due to Ontario’s “have-not” status was a temporary
phenomenon.
23 Consider the extreme case where the fixed growth rate is in place and nine provinces move very close to the standard
and one is slightly below it; that one province, despite being only a little behind the others, would be entitled to a
huge and rising payment.
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TABLE 2 IMPACT OF THE FIXED-GROWTH-RULE ON EQUALIZATION PAYOUT
Based on data from Finance Canada
The preceding answer may seem that of a purist. There is still that nagging, but very legitimate,
affordability question. There are two responses. First, if the increase in (uncapped) payments
was not long lasting, then shifts in the other direction would at times leave the federal
government with considerable offsetting savings. For instance, if Ontario returns to strong
economic growth, oil and gas revenues of non-recipient provinces moderate, and the other
recipient provinces maintain or improve their fiscal positions, then all may move closer to the
standard, from above and below. The result would be substantial reductions in equalization
payout. Thus, lower payouts in some years would offset higher payouts in others.
On the other hand, it may be difficult to know if a shift in fiscal capacities, one that entails
substantially higher payouts, is temporary or not. Fiscal prudence may require some constraints
on program payments rather than waiting in the hope that everything averages out, as
suggested above. This brings us to a second response to the affordability question. To start, a
fixed growth rate is too blunt an instrument. Since 2009, it has served to claw back
equalization entitlements from provinces with below-standard fiscal capacities, while non-
recipients have had the good fortune of seeing their fiscal capacities improve dramatically or
remain very high. Short of constitutional changes, one cannot expect the non-recipients to
contribute directly to the higher cost of the program whenever fiscal capacities diverge.
However, one attractive option that appears quite feasible is to adjust federal CHT and CST
payments along the lines suggested by Courchene.24 Payments under the CST are made on an
equal per capita basis and, starting in 2014-15, so too will payments under the CHT.25 Under a
Courchene-type plan, all provinces would be ranked by the sum of their fiscal capacities as
defined in the equalization formula plus their other 50 per cent of natural resource revenues, 
24 Thomas J. Courchene, “Intergovernmental Transfers and Canadian Values: Retrospect and Prospect,” Policy Options
(Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, May 2010): 32-40; Thomas J. Courchene, “Surplus Recycling and
the Canadian Federation: Addressing Horizontal and Vertical Fiscal Imbalances,” Mowat Centre Fiscal Transfers
Series, University of Toronto, July 2013. Another option is to re-introduce a “personal income over-ride,” which had
the effect of excluding Ontario in the past (see note 15) and which Ontario did not oppose at the time. However,
Ontario’s current circumstances are quite different now, so adopting an ad hoc rule to exclude it no longer seems
justifiable.
25 This makes more sense for these grants, since expenditures in these areas are most likely to rise over time, whereas
equalization entitlements can be up and down as relative fiscal capacities of provinces change.
2009-10 $15,166.3 $14,185.0 $981.3
2010-11 $18,891.8 $14,372.0 $4,519.8
2011-12 $17,649.8 $14,658.6 $2,991.2
2012-13 $17,465.5 $15,422.5 $2,043.0
2013-14 $16,478.9 $16,105.2 $373.7
Total Entitlements minus equals
Total Payments Reduction due to Fixed-growth rule
plus any equalization receipts, all on a per capita basis. Provincial governments whose per
capita sum was well above the average would have their CHT and CST grants reduced
according to some proportional or progressive scale. This approach is appealing and could be
implemented with the following features:
• implement the CHT/CST clawback in conjunction with removal of any arbitrary limit on
aggregate equalization payments, thereby allowing the equalization formula to determine
the aggregate program payout;
• calculate how much equalization would have been reduced if the growth rule were in place
and use that figure to determine the CHT/CST clawbacks;
• if the equalization-growth rule implied negative clawbacks (due to a reduction in the
horizontal fiscal gap) then the savings would be transferred to all provinces on an equal per
capita basis; and
• no province would have more than a maximum fraction of their CHT and CST grants
reduced — for example, they could be assured of at least, say, 50 per cent; if this is binding
then the additional funds should come from federal general revenues.
The effect of this scheme would be to shift the equalization clawback away from the
equalization receiving provinces to the non-recipients; from the “have-nots” to the “haves.”26
In short, the imposition of a fixed-growth rule is inappropriate and contrary to the purpose of
equalization. As a matter of principle, that rule should be eliminated. Additionally, the time
lags in the formula mean that the federal government is well warned of upcoming costs and the
fiscal-capacity cap acts as a restraint on costs.27 If, despite these considerations, long-lasting
and growing gaps in fiscal capacities imply a mushrooming cost over the long term, then
shifting some of the cost burden onto the CHT and CST of the wealthier provinces is
preferable to equalization clawbacks based on an aggregate-growth-rate rule.
ISSUE: NATURAL RESOURCES
The crux of the preceding section is that the existing formula should be changed to eliminate
the reductions to a fixed-growth-rate rule. In terms of the representation given by equation (6),
that means eliminating the R. That would leave
(7) P = (S-F) – A*.
26 This assumes that, to start with, the per capita CHT and CST are adequate, which is an important but separate issue
of vertical fiscal imbalance.
27 Finance Canada data indicate that for 2013-14, the fiscal-capacity cap led to a reduction in total payout of $1.03
billion, thereby reducing the extent of the reduction due to the aggregate growth-rate rule to only $375 million.
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Also, implicit in that section is the retention of A*, the reduction in a province’s equalization
entitlement if it exceeds the fiscal-capacity cap. The fiscal-capacity cap was recommended by
the expert panel. The underlying motive was equity. The panel also had recommended that 50
per cent of natural resource revenues be included in the equalization formula. One implication
of doing so is that a recipient province with higher-than-average natural resource revenues
could surpass other recipients and even non-recipients when the other 50 per cent of natural
resource revenue was considered. The fiscal-capacity cap prevents this and, whenever
activated, reduces costs to the federal government by invoking a clawback on a province’s
entitlement. With R dropped from the formula, the fiscal-capacity cap’s cost-saving feature
would be re-asserted.28 Thus, the 50 per cent provision and the fiscal-capacity cap go hand in
hand. As long as the former is retained, the latter should be too. Therefore, the A* in (7) should
be retained.
At this point, it is useful to substitute for S and F, from (3) and (4) respectively, to obtain a
more explicit form of that formula. With a little algebraic simplification, the equalization
payment (P), with R removed, becomes
(8) P = t1(B1 – b1) + t2(B2-b2) + t3(B3 – b3) + t4(B4 – b4) + 0.5(N –n) - A*.
The purpose of decomposing (7) into (8) is to highlight the distinct treatment of natural
resource revenues. The first four terms on the right-hand side of (8) are similar. For instance,
t1(B1 – b1) is the national average provincial income tax rate t1 multiplied by the difference
between the average per capita amount of taxable personal income (B) and the average per
capita amount of taxable personal income in the province of interest. Similar interpretations
apply to the three following terms, respectively: business income taxes consumption taxes, and
property taxes. However, the fifth term, which corresponds to natural resource taxation
revenues, is different. The N denotes the actual average of all provincial governments’ natural
resource revenues per capita, while the n is the corresponding revenue in the province of
interest. The national average tax rate on resources does not come into play. The difference is
multiplied by 0.5, corresponding to the 50 per cent inclusion, whereas all the others are,
implicitly, multiplied by one, reflecting 100 per cent inclusion. In effect, the first four terms in
(8) are measures of fiscal-capacity gaps in their respective tax areas. The fifth term, the one
relating to the gap in natural resource revenues, is not a measure of fiscal capacity. It is simply
the difference, or more precisely, half the difference, in actual natural resource revenues. In
contrast, the measures of the fiscal-capacity gaps are based on the difference in revenues that
would occur if a province applied the relevant national average tax rate, not its actual tax rate.
Thus, the equalization formula is a hybrid of sorts.
28 With the fixed-growth-rate rule on aggregate payments, any reductions due the fiscal-capacity cap are redundant.
However, the distributional impact across provinces would be different because the growth-rate rule reduces
payments to recipients on an equal per capita basis, while the reductions to recipients based on the fiscal-capacity cap
vary with those recipients’ natural resource revenues.
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This asymmetric treatment of provincial natural resource revenues in the equalization formula
is not a new phenomenon. Throughout most of the history of the program, natural resource
revenues have been treated differently.29 Without delving into that history, it is worthwhile to
point out two challenges associated with equalizing natural resource revenues:
• natural resources, especially high-revenue yielding oil and gas, are very unevenly
distributed across the provinces relative to other revenue sources, which makes equalization
costly; and
• the provinces own the natural resources within their borders and the Constitution gives
them the sole right to impose royalties on them, so the federal government is excluded from
this revenue source.
Thus, if 100 per cent of natural resource revenue is equalized across provincial governments, it
can become an expensive problem for the federal government, especially during times of high
resource prices or large-scale development. At the same time, if a recipient province has
increasing natural resource revenue then, as that revenue rises, its equalization entitlement
would fall on a dollar-for-dollar basis.30 This seems unfair to those provinces since they would
be no better off than if the resource development did not take place, and some could argue that
the dollar-for-dollar loss amounts to a tax on their natural resource revenues. On the other
hand, if natural resource revenues are excluded in the calculation of equalization, then
provinces that are well off in terms of natural resource revenues could be actually become
recipients, which was the case for Alberta in the first few years of the program. 
Cutting through these opposing perspectives, the expert panel recommended a 50 per cent
inclusion rule with its sibling fiscal-capacity cap. This is a reasonable compromise position that
recognizes the affordability problem and the equity issues, as well as the concerns of resource-
rich recipient provinces. Interestingly, the panel recommended, and the federal government
agreed, that this 50 per cent would apply to actual natural resource revenues, not natural
resource fiscal capacity. This serves to simplify the calculations. Determining natural resource
fiscal capacity is complicated and requires a great deal of disaggregation (e.g., oil of different
qualities and locations give rise to different royalty potential). Even then, measurement
problems are challenging and can lead to difficulties. For instance, Courchene31 shows that the
fiscal-capacity approach resulted in Saskatchewan’s government losing more than a dollar in
equalization for every for revenue dollar for some of its oil and gas revenues. Using actual
revenues eliminates the underlying measurement problem. Yet, as Smart points out,32 doing so
creates some perverse incentives for recipient provinces to lower their taxes/royalties on natural
resources to benefit residents, while being cushioned by equalization. However, considering that
forestry, oil and gas, and mining operations, which account for the bulk of provincial natural
resource revenues, are owned by widely held corporations, lowering taxes/royalties would
benefit non-residents to a substantial degree, thereby reducing that perverse incentive.
29 For an elaboration on that history, see: James P. Feehan, “Equalization and the Provinces’ Natural Resource
Revenues: Partial Equalization Can Work Better,” in Canadian Fiscal Arrangements: What Works, What Might Work
Better, ed. H. Lazar (Montreal- Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005): 185-208; and Feehan
“Equalization 2007.”
30 This is an approximation because the provincial revenue would raise the standard as well. However, most provinces
are not large enough for this to have a significant effect.
31 Thomas J. Courchene, “Confiscatory Equalization: The Intriguing Case of Saskatchewan’s Vanishing Energy
Revenues,” Choices (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2004).
32 Michael Smart, “Equalization and Resource Taxation,” in A Fine Canadian Compromise, ed. Paul Boothe (Institute
of Public Economics and Cirano, 2006).
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It seems likely that, had this sort of arrangement been in place at the time, there would have
much less likelihood of the special side deals in 2005 with Nova Scotia and Newfoundland to
compensate them for reductions in equalization due to offshore oil and gas revenues. Even the
provisions for similar compensation for those two provinces, in the Atlantic and Offshore
accords signed in the mid-1980s, might not have been necessary, and similarly for the
“generic” solution of 1997.33 Thus, another commendable aspect of the expert-panel
recommendation is that it pre-empts pressure for such side deals and special arrangements that
tend to undermine the program’s credibility.
Nevertheless, there are two aspects of the natural-resource-revenue component of the formula
that still need to be better handled. One is quite prominent in the debate over equalization and
has a long history: water-power rentals. The other is much more obscure and of recent vintage:
Hydroelectric Crown corporations.
Hydroelectric Crown Corporations
The expert panel recommended that the remittances from provincial Crown corporations
engaged in resource extraction and development should be treated as natural resource
revenue.34 The federal government acted on this recommendation by including the remittances
of “hydroelectric” Crown corporations in the natural-resource-revenue category. This limitation
to a single resource, namely hydroelectricity, is not, in current circumstances, a significant
deviation from the panel’s recommendation, because the involvement of provincial Crown
corporations in other natural resources is quite limited. 
The inclusion of these Crown corporations within the natural resource category creates many
practical and conceptual problems and contradictions. This is highlighted by the 2009 federal
decision to adjust the equalization calculation by moving Hydro One, the major transmission
company in Ontario and owned by the Ontario government, from the natural resource category
to the business income taxes category. Apparently, the reason for this was that Hydro One has
no hydroelectric or other generating assets; it is strictly a transmitter. However, all six
provincial hydroelectric Crown corporations are vertically integrated, with substantial
transmission assets.35 The implication is that only the portion of those corporations that are
involved in natural resource extraction and development (i.e., electricity generation) should be
in the natural resource category, and the rest should be in the business income tax category.
This clearly creates practical difficulties. To carry this point further, two provincial Crown-
owned electric utilities — New Brunswick Power and SaskPower — rely mostly on burning
purchased fossil fuels for electricity generation and have very few hydro-generation assets and
little or no potential hydro resource left to develop within their borders. How can the
remittances from those two corporations be considered natural resource revenues? Indeed, this
question applies to the others as well. They operate on a commercial basis and their net
incomes include a return on capital.
33 The generic solution limited the approximate dollar-for-dollar loss in equalization in cases where a province
accounted for more than 70 per cent of a single revenue type. With the use of 30 or more disaggregated categories,
this was a distinct possibility at the time, especially for some types of natural resource revenues. For example, it
benefited Saskatchewan with respect to revenues from potash.
34 See page 61 of the expert panel report for the recommendation and page 113 for further elaboration.
35 The six are: Hydro-Quebec, BC Hydro, SaskPower, Manitoba Hydro, New Brunswick Power and Newfoundland and
Labrador Hydro.
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Then there is the broader issue of consistency. The profits of all other government-owned
business enterprises (GBEs) are included in the business income tax category. To separate out
certain GBEs simply because they have some — possibly very small — hydroelectric
generating capacity, is very difficult to justify. Moreover, the tax revenue from a privately
owned electricity utility is categorized with business income taxes; if the identity of the
shareholders is changed to the provincial government, then there is no obvious reason to
reclassify that same business’s income as natural resource revenue. This principle should also
be applied to municipally owned business enterprises that have commercial mandates.
Apparently these are not included in equalization despite the fact that some are quite large
enterprises (for example, Toronto Hydro).
In light of these considerations, the remittances of hydro corporations should be removed from
the natural resource revenues category. The business income tax category of the equalization
formula includes the net incomes of all other provincial GBEs. The net income of Crown hydro
corporations should also be included there in the same way as any other commercial
provincial-government-owned business enterprise.
Water Rentals
Despite the weak case for treating hydro corporation remittances as natural resource revenue,
the expert panel did have a noble intent. It pointed out that in provinces with provincially
owned, vertically integrated electric utilities, it would be possible for provincial governments
to either charge high water-rentals and require low remittances, or the opposite. If water
rentals, which are royalties on the use of provincial water resources, are in the natural resource
category, and the remittances are in the business income category, then strategic shifting could
increase a recipient province’s entitlement.36 Whether a province would actually engage in that
practice is an open question, but the incentive exists, and surely it would be a consideration of
policy-makers. By placing both sources of revenue into the one category, the panel’s intent was
to eliminate that incentive.
Even more problematic is the incentive for recipient provinces to charge very low water-rentals
in the first place. Here, the concerns raised by Smart37 are especially relevant. Hydroelectricity
is largely consumed in the province of generation. Therefore, lower electricity rates achieved
by charging low water-rentals (and/or taking low returns on hydro-corporation capital) will
benefit resident household consumers and businesses. This is not a new issue in the
equalization debate. It has been long in play and received considerable attention in the early
1980s from the Economic Council of Canada.38 The council effectively recommended that
water rentals be included in the formula and that they should be based on their economic value
36 A dollar of water rental would cause a 50-cent reduction in equalization. However, if that water rental were
eliminated and the dollar went into a remittance from profits, then the reduction in equalization would be at a rate
equal to the national average provincial tax rate on business income, which is much lower at approximately 10 per
cent.
37 Michael Smart, “Raising taxes through equalization,” Canadian Journal of Economics 40 (2007): 1188-1212.
38 Economic Council of Canada, Financing Confederation: Today and Tomorrow (Ottawa: Supply and Services
Canada, 1982).
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rather than the actual rates charged.39 The expert panel also dealt with this issue and also
recognized that the true economic values (i.e., economic rent) should be counted in the
equalization formula in principle, but stated that doing so would be “difficult and
controversial,” and opted not to recommend action in this regard. As the 2014 renewal
approaches, the matter has once again, and not surprisingly, arisen.40 It is time to deal with it.
Table 3 provides some elaboration. The first two rows show the relative and absolute amounts
of hydroelectricity generated within each province for 2009. By these indicators, four
provinces are abundant in hydro power: Newfoundland, Quebec, B.C. and Manitoba. Ontario
has some significant amount in absolute terms, but it still derives less than 25 per cent of its
power generation from hydro. The other provinces have very little. Focusing on the four that
have abundant hydro generation, the third and last rows of the table give some indication of the
revenues that these provinces determine from their royalties on water used for hydro
generation. Particularly outstanding are the water-rental revenues per megawatt hour (MWh) of
hydroelectricity generation. The three traditional equalization recipients, Newfoundland
(having been in receipt every year until 2008), Quebec and Manitoba collected $0.07, $3.36
and $3.45 per MWh respectively.41 In contrast, B.C., the only other hydro-abundant province,
took in $8.40. Even Ontario, the only other province with a significant amount of hydro power,
and not ever an equalization recipient until 2009, collected $5.00 per MW hour in rentals. 
TABLE 3 HYDRO-ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND WATER RENTALS, BY PROVINCE
Sources: Water rentals and population data from Finance Canada; Electricity data from 
Canadian Electricity Association (2012) “Key Canadian Electricity Statistics,” release May 21, 2013,
http://www.electricity.ca/media/IndustryData/KeyCanadianElectricityStatistics21May2013.pdf.
39 See: ibid, 122. For more on the estimation of the true economic value of hydropower, see: Richard Zuker and Glenn
Jenkins, Blue Gold: Hydro-Electric Rent in Canada, Special Study Series (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada,
1984).
40 See, for example: Peter Holle, “Artificially cheap hydro power, your equalization dollars at work,” in A Hand Up or
a Handout, The Canadian Taxpayers Federation, 2013.
41 Even allowing for the fact that most of Newfoundland’s hydro, more than 30 million MWh, is generated at Churchill
Falls under a lease arrangement that fixed the rental at a very low rate from 1969 to 2016, the rental revenues on the
remaining hydro generation in that province are still practically negligible.
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NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC
Proportion of in-province
generation from hydro (2011)
Amount of hydro generation, in
millions of MW hours (2011)
Water rental (2009), millions of
dollars
Water rental revenue per capita 
Water rental revenue per MW hour
96.7% 0% 9.9% 34.0% 97.2% 24.7% 98.4% 20.1% 2.8% 92.1%
39.4 0 1.1 3.8 191.3 34.7 34.2 4.6 1.8 61.2
$2.8 $0 $1.5 $0 $660.4 $173.6 $114.7 $0 $1.8 $514.2
$5.60 $0 $1.63 $0 $84.48 $13.30 $94.21 $0 $0.48 $115.45
$0.07 $0 $1.39 $0 $3.45 $5.00 $3.36 $0 $0.97 $8.40
These figures are consistent with the long-standing proposition that hydro-rich equalization-
receiving provinces charge lower water-rental rates, and those non-recipients with significant
hydro resources charge more. In effect, those provinces can underprice their hydro, which
benefits residents, while lower hydro revenues will make them eligible for at least partial
compensation via a higher equalization entitlement. This is a unique phenomenon among
natural resource revenues, because, as noted earlier, undercharging for other resources gives a
much larger share of the benefit to non-resident owners of natural resource enterprises. Many
argue that Manitoba and Quebec, with their low electricity rates, receive more equalization
than they ought to. Whether they do this to obtain more equalization or, plausibly, to pursue
resource and industrial development, their policy decision is partly paid for by equalization.
Now is the time to deal with this lingering sore point of undervalued water rentals. While it has
been long recognized as a problem, and a rather unique one, the inherent difficulties of setting
an accurate value for hydroelectricity has been cited as a barrier to addressing the matter. Also,
the potential dollar-implications for some recipients might have been problematic, especially in
the past where the hydro values may have been very high. However, these considerations have
changed. First, the increased development of competitive wholesale electricity markets in
North America has resulted in prices that can serve as indicators of the value of electricity. In
particular, U.S. markets adjacent to the Canadian border — such as the New England, New
York, Mid-Columbia, and Midwest markets — are where Canadian electricity can be sold, and
both Alberta and Ontario have moved to market-based systems. In effect, these markets
provide a “world price” benchmark, much the same as the Brent and West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) benchmarks provide for crude oil. Secondly, with declining prices of natural gas,
wholesale electricity prices have softened. With these markets providing relatively low
reference prices to start with, the use of market prices would be unlikely to cause an immediate
dramatic shift in equalization entitlements, especially if water rentals remain subject to the 50
per cent equalization rule. Yet, it would have the advantage of taking windfall gains into
account whenever there may be substantial upward movement in U.S. electricity prices — that
is, in the underlying value of the hydro resource.
One way to make this market-price approach operational would be to remove water-rental
revenue from the equalization formula and replace it with a measure of water-rental fiscal
capacity. This would look like:
(9) tH(BH – bH)
where bH denotes the amount of hydroelectricity generated and made available to consumers
within a province, expressed on a per capita basis. This would be the lesser of (a) actual hydro
generation and (b) hydro generation minus any net exports.42 BH denotes the aggregate of such
generation, divided by the population of all provinces. Thus, both B and b are in MWh per
capita.
42 Exports would naturally be sold at whatever price could be obtained. 
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The challenge here is what to use for tH. For the other fiscal-capacity measures, the relevant
national average tax rate is used. However, the key criticism for this particular revenue source
is that such a rate is too low because hydro-rich provinces may be underpricing their rentals in
order to provide low-price electricity to their residents. Therefore tH should be market-based.
Once an initial value is determined, it could be indexed to some average of wholesale prices in
electricity markets. The choice of the initial value requires more research, but the figures in
Table 3 might suggest a starting point. For 2009, the highest rental per MWh was around $8.50
in B.C.; and in Ontario, not a hydro rich province, but one with significant generation in
absolute terms, the figure was about $5.00. Some figure in that $5.00 to $8.50 range might be a
candidate for tH. The actual choice might well be contentious, but once set, everything else
follows without difficulty since hydro-generation statistics and wholesale market prices are
readily available. 
ISSUE: PROPERTY TAXES AND USER FEES
Property tax is a relatively new addition to the equalization formula. In 1967, only revenue
from property taxes levied by provincial governments for school financing was included in
equalization; property tax revenues of municipal governments remained excluded. In 1973, the
revenue from school-purpose property taxes collected by municipal governments was included
as well.43 However, the remainder of property tax revenue, which was the bulk of it, was not
included in equalization until 1982. At the same time, practically all user fees imposed by
provincial and municipal governments were included in the equalization formula. As with
property taxes, user fees are disproportionately more important as a revenue source for
municipal governments. More generally, since municipal governments are essentially creations
of provincial government, and provide services that would otherwise be provided by provincial
governments, it is entirely appropriate that their fiscal capacities be included in the calculation
of provincial fiscal capacity.
By 1999 the federal government wanted to once again exclude user fees from the equalization
formula but, as a compromise with provincial governments, continued to include 50 per cent of
such revenues.44 The reason may have had to do with affordability, but there were also
measurement difficulties associated with defining the base and “tax rate” for this revenue
source. Also, some prominent academics argued that inclusion of user fees in the formula was
not conceptually valid. On the other hand, there was no question of removing property taxes
from the equalization formula. However, there were also serious challenges associated with
measuring property tax bases across provinces. Essentially, the problem was that, historically,
provincial and municipal governments used a wide variety of means of taxing property. That
made the measurement of provincial tax bases and the national average property tax rate
problematic. Various indirect measurement techniques were developed. The most long-lasting
one was called the multi-concept approach, a system that has been described as “convoluted
and obscure.”45 This is probably a harsh assessment because the procedures were designed to
estimate values that were not directly observable, which is often a difficult task.
43 See: Courchene, Equalization Payments, 47-48.
44 See: Expert Panel, 101.
45 See: MacNevin, The Canadian Federal-Provincial, 212.
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These were the circumstances when the expert panel took on its task. The panel agreed with
federal government sentiments regarding user fees. It recommended against inclusion of user-
fee revenues, whether provincial or municipal, in the formula. Regarding property taxes, it
recognized that measurement issues were difficult, and the panel indicated a preference for an
approach that would be more obviously consistent with property taxation practices, at least for
residential property tax.46 In response, the federal government acted accordingly. It dropped
user fees entirely from the formula and adopted a new methodology for calculating fiscal
capacity in relation to residential property tax. In particular, for residential properties, it moved
to a method based on property values. Those values are the actual basis for most municipal
property taxes, so this is an obvious and welcome improvement.47
The business component of property tax is still governed by the multi-concept methodology,
but it is almost certain that the federal government would move to a better method if and
whenever that were to become feasible. One possible alternative worth considering is to shift
revenues from business property taxes into the business income tax category, leaving only
residential properties in the property tax base. The business income tax base would not change,
but the addition of the tax payments by businesses on their properties would raise the formula’s
national average tax rate on business income. Doing so could be rationalized by the argument
that these taxes ultimately fall on businesses’ incomes.48
Also, the exclusion of user fees, especially at the municipal level, is a decision worth
revisiting. Revenues from user fees are a substantial proportion of most municipal
governments’ own-source revenues, second only to property-related taxes.49 In fact, these two
tax sources are the only two significant ones for practically all municipalities. Thus, a decision
to change user fees necessarily implies a decision about property tax, and vice versa, given
budgeted expenses. With respect to equalization, a shift by municipalities in some provinces
towards more user fees and lower property tax rates would lower the national average tax rate
on property and have implications for equalization entitlements, despite the fact that there may
have been no change in those municipalities’ capacities to raise revenue. In light of this
substitutability between municipal user fees and property taxation, the former should be
included in the equalization formula. This is completely feasible since the user-fee revenues are
known and the same tax base (i.e., property) would continue to be used. The only implication
of including municipal user fees would be an increase in the national average tax rate for that
revenue category, and therefore an increase in the value of the standard.50
46 The panel also supported such an approach with respect to business properties, but recognized that there were more
difficult measurement issues at play, which meant that a change from current practices was not feasible.
47 Regardless of the panel’s recommendation, this might have happened anyway because, over time, property taxation
policies have become more consistent and relevant data have become more readily available. 
48 A similar argument could be made about residential property tax with respect to personal income but, with the recent
improvements in measuring residential property tax bases, this is unnecessary.
49 See: Harry M. Kitchen and Enid Slack, “Special Study: New Finance Options for Municipal Governments,”
Canadian Tax Journal 51 (2003): 2215- 2275. 
50 Despite the increase in the standard, whether the cost to the program would increase depends on the distribution of
the property tax fiscal-capacity gaps. If a recipient province has a negative entitlement under that category, then
raising the applicable national average tax would reduce that province’s entitlement.
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Vaillancourt has made a similar argument for inclusion of all user fees, not just municipal ones
as suggested above.51 He uses the example of provinces that can choose to finance university
education via either higher tuition/lower personal income tax rates, or the reverse. However,
this is a step too far for two reasons. First, and more importantly, while municipal user fees can
be readily related to the existing property tax base, the choice of base for most provincial user
fees is not so clear-cut. Provincial fees are tied to a gamut of activities, making it inherently
difficult to identify the appropriate base, let alone to measure it accurately.52 Secondly,
provincial governments have a much wider spectrum of tax instruments and their actual
reliance on user fees, at least within the government sector, is very small relative to total
revenue. Therefore, as a practical matter, adding provincial user fees would likely be of
negligible significance. 
BEYOND THE BLACK BOX: SOME OBSERVATIONS
Up to this point, this essay has focused on describing the “black box” of the equalization
formula and delving into some of the issues inside of it. However, there are some matters on
the outside that are relevant to the equalization debate. This section looks at three.
The Over-equalization Hypothesis
Recently there have been several criticisms of equalization, all of which appear to be related to
a general proposition that several recipient provinces receive too much equalization, that too
much is spent on equalization, and that equalization spending, at least at current levels, is
damaging to the national economy. Broadly speaking, this might be called “the over-
equalization hypothesis.” In various forms, this idea has been voiced by, for example,
McKinnon, Bateman, Dodge, Burn and Dion, and Milke, among others.53 Particularly
interesting is the analysis by Milke. Using 19 measures of provincial government employment
and provision of public services, his data analysis led to the finding that, for most of these
indicators, the traditional recipient provinces led the non-recipients. This finding supports the
proposition that equalization recipients provide more public services than those provinces that
are too rich to qualify for equalization, and whose taxpayers contribute disproportionately to
financing equalization through their federal tax payments.
51 Francois Vaillancourt, “Inclusion and Measurement Issues,” in A Fine Canadian Compromise, ed. Paul Boothe
(Institute of Public Economics and Cirano, 2006).
52 An alternative is to use actual revenues, as with natural resources. But, as pointed out by the expert panel (p.104) this
is problematic as well.
53 David McKinnon, “Canada’s Broken Equalization Program,” AIMS Commentary (Halifax: Atlantic Institute for
Market Studies, 2012); Jordan Bateman, A Hand Up or A Hand Out: Ideas on how to improve Canada’s Equalization
program, Canadian Taxpayers Federation, 2013; Dodge, David, Peter Burn and Richard Dion, “Federal-Provincial
Fiscal Arrangements: Thinking Outside the Box,” Policy Options (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy,
2012); Mark Milke, Super-sized fiscal federalism (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2013).
21
On the contrary, McMillan54 provides a very different perspective. In a comprehensive
examination of the data, he concludes that equalization spending has not been rising relative to
overall federal spending or as a percentage of national GDP. Consistent with this, Table 4
shows that relative to CHT and CST spending, federal government expenditure on equalization
has not followed an upward trend. The table also brings home the point that equalization has
been consistently less than 30 per cent of the total of the three major transfers to provincial
governments, although a spike would have occurred from 2010-11 to 2012-13 without the
imposition of the growth-rate cap in 2009.
TABLE 4    EQUALIZATION RELATIVE TO CHT AND CST
Source: Based on data from Finance Canada, “Federal Support to Provinces and Territories,” 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/mtp-eng.asp.
A particularly important finding by McMillan is that the overall per capita spending by
recipient and non-recipient provinces is roughly the same. This is at odds with the over-
equalization hypothesis. Another interesting finding is that the recipient provinces tend to have
higher tax rates. This may well be the result of the workings of the equalization program. It is
consistent with the important empirical work by Smart,55 which established an empirical
relationship between the tendency to have higher taxes and the equalization program. The
higher tax rates would feed into and raise the national average tax rates, and this would support
the notion of over-equalization. On the other hand, there may be opposing forces at work. Non-
recipient provinces, especially since 2009, are natural-resource rich, especially in oil and gas. It
could be argued that for them, natural resource revenues are “easy” money. The burden of
natural resource royalties falls heavily on the resource and the non-resident owners of oil and
gas enterprises. With plentiful natural resource revenues, these provinces can engage in high
spending and impose low tax rates on resident personal income, business income, property and
consumption. Recipient provinces may think of equalization as easy money in the sense that it
is not raised by their taxes on locals, but the only way to distribute this money is through
higher spending, not via a mix of lower taxes and higher spending, because the lower taxes
adversely affect entitlements. Natural resource revenue allows the “haves” to lower other taxes,
while equalization dollars leads to an upward tendency in tax rates in the “have-nots.” The net
effect on national average tax rates becomes ambiguous.
54 Melville L. McMillan, “Alberta and ‘Equalization’: Separating Fact from Fiction or Sorting Out Some Implications
and Options in Canadian Fiscal Federalism,” Information Bulletin 155 (University of Alberta School of Business/
Western Centre for Economic Research, 2012).
55 Smart, “Raising taxes.”
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2006- 2007- 2008- 2009- 2010- 2011- 2012- 2013- 2014-
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
CHT $20.1 $21.7 $22.7 $24.4 $25.6 $26.9 $28.5 $30.2 $32.0
CST $8.5 $9.6 $10.5 $10.8 $11.1 $11.5 $11.8 $12.2 $12.5
Equalization $11.5 $12.9 $13.5 $14.2 $14.4 $14.7 $15.4 $16.1 $16.7
Total $40.1 $44.2 $46.7 $49.4 $51.1 $53.0 $55.7 $58.5 $61.2
Equalization as % of total 28.8% 29.3% 28.8% 28.7% 28.1% 27.7% 27.7% 27.5% 27.2%
Regardless of the preceding speculative thinking, it does appear that the worries about over-
equalization are overstated. There may well be a tendency for the recipients, at least the
traditional ones, to have higher tax rates, but the proposition that this has led to significant
excessive expenditure on equalization has yet to be demonstrated. The fact is that spending on
equalization has not changed much relative to national income or total federal spending. If
there is over-equalization, and there is little evidence of it, then it is not a serious or growing
problem.
Needs and Costs.
Another matter well outside the box containing the RTS equalization formula has to do with
needs and costs. The RTS approach eliminates, or at least reduces gaps in revenue-raising
capacities. Implicit in this approach is an assumption that the cost of providing public services
across provinces is the same and that the public-service needs of people are equal on a per
capita basis. Such an assumption may not be valid. It might be that a province with strong
revenue-raising capacity might also have high costs and more pressing needs, while an
equalization-receiving province may have the good fortune of less need and lower costs of
providing public services. Similarly, two recipient provinces might have very different needs
and costs even though their fiscal capacity to raise revenue might be similar. These are the
sorts of considerations put forward by those advocating extending the equalization program to
include costs and needs. Buttressing this position is the Canadian Constitution. Indeed, it seems
impossible to avoid quoting Section 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, in any essay about
equalization. That section states:
“Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of
making equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have
sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public
services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.”
Section 36(2)’s reference to “reasonably comparable levels of public services” is almost always
cited in arguments in favour of incorporating expenditure needs and adjustments for costs of
providing public services. However, the arguments for a system that incorporates need long
pre-date this constitutional provision.56 
Despite the history of this idea, no attempt has ever been made to incorporate need and cost
into the formula. While usually considered in major reviews of Canada’s federal-provincial
transfer system, inclusion of the spending side of provincial budgets has not been supported.
Various difficulties of implementation are cited: data requirements, the potential for intrusion
into provincial spending priorities, measurement issues, etc. This issue was also considered by
the expert panel, which concluded that “the case for incorporating expenditure need into
equalization has not been made” and, very significantly that “There is no conclusive evidence
that it would have a material effect on the size and allocation of equalization payments.”
56 Brown points out that the notion of equalization-type transfer grants based on need goes back to 1940s, even before
the establishment of the program itself (Douglas M. Brown, Equalization on the Basis of Need in Canada, Institute
of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, 1996).
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Yet, the idea has been recently resurrected. In a pioneering work, Gusen57 provided rebuttals to
the various rationales that have been put forth for not moving on needs and costs.58 Also, he
constructed indices of costs and needs and used them to determine what the allocation of
equalization would look like if this side of provincial budgets were taken into account. Using
the fiscal year 2008-09 for his prototype system, he finds that overall equalization payments
would fall modestly and that there would be a significant change in the allocation of that total
amount, largely to the benefit of Ontario and to the loss of Quebec.59 These results challenge
the expert panel’s assessment that including needs would not have a “material effect.”
Still, there are reasons not to proceed. First, consider incorporation of costs. Ignoring the
possibility that a higher cost of providing a unit of public service might be due to inefficiency
or market power, which cannot justify equalization grants, suppose the cost is higher. In that
case, fewer public services should be provided. Which ones and by how much would depend
on the social benefits of the services, but some adjustment is required much in the same way as
public services to rural, isolated communities are not provided to the same extent as they are in
more urbanized areas. Equalization based on cost is not consistent with efficiency and reduces
the incentive for provinces to use their fiscal resources wisely.
Next, assume that costs are the same across provinces but that needs are different. For
example, the health cost of caring for an elderly person might be the same across provinces but
one province might have a relatively greater proportion of elderly people in its population.
Here, the case for some adjustment in equalization is stronger. However, the open-ended nature
of provincial spending could create difficulties in drawing the line with respect to what are
appropriate levels of public services. It seems that no matter how well off provinces may be,
there is always spending pressure. Consider Table 5, which shows the budgetary positions for
each provincial government in 2012-13, expressed on a per capita basis. All but Saskatchewan
have significant deficits. Saskatchewan, a non-recipient province, had a very small surplus. Of
the other three “have” provinces, B.C. has a significant deficit but it is less than the others. On
the other extreme, Alberta and Newfoundland, despite their very high fiscal capacities,
especially when all natural resource revenue is considered, have the largest deficits. The six
recipient provinces fall somewhere in between. It seems that, despite enormous revenue
capacity, even the richest provinces’ spending rises to match or exceed income. Thus,
equalization on the basis of need would likely invite federal limits, which could be seen as
interfering with the judgment of provincial governments regarding spending priorities. For
Canada’s highly decentralized federation, that is not a path worth taking.
57 Peter Gusen, “Expenditure Need: Equalization’s Other Half,” Mowat Centre Fiscal Transfers Series, University of
Toronto, 2012.
58 Another substantial contribution to the debate regarding the implications of equalization according to fiscal need is:
Anwar Shah, “A Fiscal Need Approach to Equalization,” Canadian Public Policy 22 (1996): 99-115. 
59 Mendelsohn argues that this only serves to worsen Ontario’s treatment with respect to what its citizens contribute to
financing equalization and what its provincial government receives.  (Matthew Mendelsohn, “Back to Basics: The
Future of the Fiscal Arrangements,” Mowat Centre Fiscal Transfers Series, University of Toronto, 2012). 
24
TABLE 5 BUDGET BALANCES OF EQUALIZATION RECIPIENTS
Sources: Finance Canada, Fiscal Reference Tables (October 2013) for budget balances; 
Statistics Canada for population.
It can be argued that failure to extend the equalization formula to encompass expenditure needs
is contrary to Section 36(2), in particular to its reference to “reasonably comparable levels of
public services.” However, for the many years preceding, and after, that constitutional
provision came into existence, the notion of equalization on only the revenue side was, and
continues to be, widely accepted, albeit not universally so. Moreover, the word “reasonably”
creates considerable scope for interpretation. It is apparent that within provinces, there are wide
variations in the level of public services offered to citizens. These differences are correlated
with factors such as urban versus rural, north versus south, isolated versus accessible, and so
forth. Such internal gaps are accepted as reasonable when the cost of providing equal services
is taken into account. It is an empirical question, but it may well be that intra-provincial
variations in the levels of public services are as great or greater than existing interprovincial
ones. 
Extending the equalization to expenditure needs and costs would be a Pandora’s box, both with
respect to the open-ended nature of provincial spending and the autonomy of provincial
governments in their areas of expenditure responsibility. A preferable approach is for the
federal government to adjust the CHT and CST to reflect relevant demographic and other
considerations that affect needs within the set of provincial programs that these grants are
intended to help support.
Taxing Provincial Crown Corporations
One vexing aspect of equalization becomes especially pronounced during resource (i.e., oil and
gas) booms. The increased revenues of the resource-rich provinces tend to increase the
equalization standard and widen the horizontal fiscal gaps. This drives up equalization
entitlements. At the same time, the federal government cannot tax natural resources within
provincial borders, so any increase in payments must be funded from elsewhere, such as
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disproportionately from Ontario. As a result, that province sees itself — or more precisely, its
taxpayers — as bearing the burden of equalization despite being less rich than the oil and gas
provinces. At present, this troubling distributional complication is worsened by the fact that all
four of the “have” provinces are resource rich; if some recipients were resource rich, then a
resource boom would reduce their entitlements and lead to some federal savings. Additionally,
some might point to the hydro-rich recipient provinces and argue that they underprice their
hydroelectricity because of low water-rentals and because their hydro corporations are exempt
from federal corporate income tax. The matter of water rentals can be addressed within the
equalization formula along the lines suggested earlier. However, the applicability of corporate
income tax is an outside-the-box issue. Still, it does fall sufficiently within the broader ambit of
federal-provincial fiscal relations to warrant attention.
The dominant provincial Crown corporations are the hydroelectricity ones, but provincial
corporations reach into other resources sectors as well, and beyond. For example, BC Hydro
has a subsidiary, Powerex, which is a profit-motivated energy trading company; the
Newfoundland Crown corporation, Nalcor, has a wholly owned subsidiary that is engaged in
oil and gas exploration, development and production; and Quebec has recently stepped up its
entry into the oil and gas sector.60 In the case of private companies engaged in similar
activities, the federal government at least sees increased corporate income tax revenue from
those businesses’ increased capital earnings during resource booms. This is not so if the capital
is owned by a provincial Crown corporation. This phenomenon worsens the distribution
problem within equalization. More broadly, it is a potential source of inefficiency in the
national allocation of capital, because returns on capital in exactly the same uses are being
treated differently solely on the basis of ownership. The latter observation applies to all
provincial commercial Crown corporations, not just those in the resource sector, such as
SaskTel.
Under Section 125 of the Constitution Act, neither level of government can tax the other. This
is why provincial Crown corporations, even those that have a profit-making mandate, pay no
federal corporate income tax. The desirability of this arrangement has been questioned before.
As Courchene observes,61 a 1981 parliamentary task force on federal-provincial fiscal relations
raised this matter, and Courchene applauds them for doing so. Concerned at the time primarily
with the entry of federal and provincial Crown corporations into the resource sector, the task
force concluded that if the practice became more common:
“An amendment to the Constitution permitting the taxation of Crown
corporations may be appropriate. Alternatively, the federal and provincial
governments could agree to reciprocal taxation of Crown Corporations.”
60 Quebec recently announced substantial investment in oil exploration around Anticosti Island. See: Paul Delean,
“Quebec buys into Anticosti oil exploration,” The Gazette, February 13, 2014,
www.montrealgazette.com/business/Quebec+buys+into+Anticosti+exploration/9506226/story.html.
61 Courchene, Equalization Payments, 292.
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The second of these options seems entirely feasible. Agreements have long been in place in
which both levels of government agree to pay one another’s taxes or provide roughly
equivalent payments in lieu of taxes, a practice which extends to municipal governments. The
only significant exception is the application of corporate income tax. This should be revisited.
For-profit municipal, provincial and federal government corporations should be subject to
federal corporate income tax or equivalent fiscal arrangements should be made.62 To the extent
that this encompasses provincial hydro corporations, and ones engaged in oil and gas and other
resource-related activity, there would be a likely small but beneficial impact with respect to the
affordability question.63 More generally, taxing such enterprises would treat capital employed
in similar activities on a similar basis, which is widely accepted as a practice that is supportive
of overall economic efficiency.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The expert panel provided the federal government with sound advice on equalization, advice
that not all would agree on, but which reflected a thoughtful assessment of opposing
perspectives. In turn, the federal government was wise to accept practically all the panel’s
recommendations. However, in 2009, the federal government’s imposition of the fixed-growth-
rate rule for total payout was a serious setback to the principled formula that had been adopted.
As in the past, this ad hoc measure was motivated by legitimate concerns about program
affordability. Nevertheless, the use of blunt instruments in this regard is a practice that should
stop. Payouts ought to be allowed to increase and decrease with the variations in the fiscal gaps
across provinces. Affordability, when it arises, should be addressed in another way. One way is
to share the burden with the “have” provinces by adjusting the CHT and CST entitlements of
the especially well-off ones. Not viewing the three main federal-provincial transfers as three
distinct silos should also come into play with respect to the provincial needs and program
costs. Adjusting the CHT and CST for factors related to needs would avoid the complexities of
extending equalization for that purpose.
In short, the RTS-type formula should remain intact and there should be no imposed limit on
aggregate equalization payout. The focus of federal policy-makers should be on improvements
to the program within those confines. One of the priorities for improvements should be re-
assessment of the exclusion of municipal user fees. Another should be the consistent treatment
of government business enterprise income. At the top of the list, however, should be dealing
with the persistent question of hydro rentals. The rise of well-developed electricity markets
now makes it more feasible than ever to resolve this matter.
62 Federal corporations that are for-profit should also be subject to provincial corporate income tax. However, past
privatizations of federal Crown corporations leave few, if any, significant ones of that type.
63 A more extreme approach would be for the federal government to seek access to natural resource revenues. That
would be much more problematic because, beyond Section 125, the provinces are buttressed by Section 92A.
Additionally, as observed in the text, there is precedent for reciprocal tax agreements. In contrast, the incursion of the
federal government through the National Energy Program of the early 1980s into provincial oil and gas jurisdiction
set an entirely negative precedent.
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